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The accounting for defined-benefit (DB) pension expense in U.S. GAAP involves offsetting 
pension costs against an expected (rather than actual) return on pension assets. Pensions 
commentators argue that this expensing model tilts pension portfolios towards riskier assets – 
as sponsoring firms can benefit from assuming higher expected rates of return on riskier assets 
(which reduce pension expense and boost reported income), without bearing the cost of higher 
volatility in reported income. We examine a recent regulatory change in U.S. GAAP, which 
mandates the relocation of the expected return on pension assets from “above the line” of to 
“below the line” of operating income. Consistent with this change reducing the financial 
reporting incentives for risk-taking, we predict and find that a sample of U.S. firms subject to 
this mandate reduces risk-taking in pension assets following the change, relative to a control 
sample of Canadian firms not subject to the change. In cross-sectional tests, we find that the 
reduction in risk-taking is more pronounced in (1) firms where the financial reporting 
incentives for risk-taking were stronger in the pre-period, and in (2) firms where the regulatory 
change particularly reduced those benefits. Our findings imply that managers are willing to 
undertake real actions (i.e., invest in riskier assets) to report favorable operating income, and 
that these incentives are incremental to the incentives to report favorable net income. They also 
provide evidence that financial reporting incentives serve as a driver of pension asset allocation 
decisions.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The accounting model for defined-benefit (DB) pension expense is extremely 
controversial. Under current U.S. GAAP, pension expense on the sponsoring firm’s income 
statement is determined by offsetting the income-decreasing components of pension expense 
(service costs and interest costs, among others) by the return on assets in the pension plan’s 
asset portfolio. However, pension costs are not offset by the actual returns earned by pension 
assets over the fiscal period; they are instead offset by expected return on pension assets, 
determined by multiplying the fair value of pension assets with a long-term expected rate of 
return (ERR) assumption chosen by managers. This “smoothing” of pension expense through 
the use of an expected (rather than actual) return has invited many criticisms; for one, that it 
invites unrealistic ERR assumptions to boost reported net income.1 For another, that it biases 
pension portfolios towards riskier investments such as equities – as sponsors can then reap the 
income statement benefits of a higher ERR (which reduces pension expense, and boosts 
reported income) without the offsetting costs of higher volatility in pension expense.2 
Academic evidence indirectly supports this contention of a “real effect” to ERR-based pension 
expense (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh 2006, Chuk 2013).  
A recent move from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) has the 
potential to dampen these financial reporting incentives to tilt towards riskier investments. 
Accounting Standards Update 2017-07 (hereafter, “ASU 2017-07”)3 alters the presentation of 
pension expense on the income statement, while keeping its measurement unchanged. 
                                                     
1 Warren Buffet, in his 2007 Letter to Shareholders, famously quipped: “What is no puzzle, however, is why CEOs 
opt for a high investment assumption. It lets them report higher earnings. And if they are wrong, as I believe they 
are, the chickens won’t come home to roost until long after they retire.” Available at: 
https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf 
2 Gold (2005), in an influential piece titled “Accounting/Actuarial Bias Enables Equity Investment by Defined 
Benefit Pension Plans” summarizes the income statement benefits of the ERR model thus: “corporate financial 
officers enjoy the benefit of the equity premium while avoiding much of the concomitant risk”. This view has 
been subsequently echoed by many, such as Frieman et al. (2005), describing the smoothing model as an “opaque 
method of accounting that highlights the rewards of equity but obscures its risks”.  
3 Accounting Standards Update 2017-07 Compensation – Retirement Benefits (Topic 715): Improving the 
Presentation of Net Periodic Pension Cost and Net Periodic Postretirement Benefit Cost (FASB 2017).  
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Specifically, it mandates the removal of all components of pension expense other than service 
cost e.g., interest cost, expected return on plan assets, amortization of actuarial gains/losses and 
prior service costs, from operating income to net income. Of particular interest is the expected 
return component, which still flows positively into net income but no longer flows into 
operating income (i.e., it moves from “above the line” to “below the line” of operating income).  
Hence, any risk premium in the ERR (arising from higher investment in risky assets) no longer 
benefits operating income, only net income. This begs the question: to the extent to which the 
financial reporting benefits of a higher ERR have declined, will sponsors tilt less towards 
riskier investments in their pension portfolios? This is the question we seek to answer in this 
study. We predict that the ASU reduces managers’ reporting-based incentives to invest in 
riskier assets, and expect some “unwinding” of pension risk-taking as a result.  
 Two conceptual questions about financial statement presentation and its impact on 
stakeholders and managers underpin our prediction in the pension setting. First, do the financial 
reporting benefits from a higher ERR indeed decline, as its impact shifts out of operating 
income solely into net income? Under ASU 2017-07’s mandated presentation, a higher ERR – 
presumably backed by higher-risk assets in the pension portfolio – will have the same impact 
as previously on net income, with the only difference being that it no longer boosts operating 
income. Therefore, this question boils down to: does operating income matter, incrementally 
to net income itself? Only if it does – and if managers believe that it does – would their prior 
incentives to tilt toward equities become lower, at the margin, once operating income no longer 
directly benefits from that tilt.  
 There are many reasons to believe that the distinction between operating income (a 
subtotal on the income statement) and net income (the “bottom line”) is nontrivial. A stream 
of literature suggests that investors perceive line items further-down on the income statement 
as more transitory (e.g., Lipe 1986; Fairfield, Sweeney, and Yohn 1996); the ASU moves the 
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expected return in that very direction. Furthermore, the pervasive use of “proforma” earnings 
numbers – many of which are conceptually closer to operating income than to net income – 
suggests that performance metrics approximating operating income could be more decision-
relevant than net income. Finally, operating income, in particular, is often used alongside net 
income in contracting. For these reasons, we predict that managerial behavior will change after 
ASU 2017-07 in response to the reduced financial reporting importance of the expected return.  
Despite these factors, the countervailing argument remains that even after ASU 2017-07, the 
expected return continues to affect net income. A higher ERR can hence still boost net income, 
an indisputably important summary metric of performance from the standpoints of valuation 
and contracting. So, whether the ASU’s reduction in the financial reporting benefits of a higher 
ERR are substantial enough to actually induce managers to shift asset allocations, begs 
empirical examination.   
 The second conceptual question underpinning our prediction is whether a GAAP-
mandated re-arrangement of pension cost components on the income statement has the ability 
to shift beliefs about firm performance sufficiently to induce a response from managers. This 
question assumes particular importance once we consider the (now, longstanding) practice of 
proforma or non-GAAP reporting. Re-arranging and/or re-measuring the components of 
pension expense to compute proforma measures has been prevalent for decades.  For example, 
when computing its own proforma measure of pension cost, Standard & Poor’s removes the 
expected return component and replaces it with the actual return on pension assets (Standard 
& Poor’s 2003). 4  Similarly, Moody’s makes a number of adjustments to “eliminate the effects 
of artificial smoothing of pension expense permitted by accounting standards” (Moody’s 2006; 
                                                     
4 Specifically, if actual returns are positive, then actual returns reduce pension expense up to the amount of 
reported interest expense.  If actual returns are negative, the full amount of actual returns is treated as an 
addition to pension expense. 
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Moody’s 2016).5  In fact, in its formulation of ASU 2017-07, the FASB acknowledges that the 
“separation of the service cost component from the other components is highly supported by 
financial statement users and is consistent with the adjustment often made by some users in 
their analyses” (ASU 2017-07, Paragraph BC12).   
Therefore, it appears that some financial statement users devote time and resources to 
re-arranging the components of pension expense, for the purpose of deriving an alternative 
measure thereof, which is presumably used as a substitute to pension expense reported on the 
income statement.  The long-standing prevalence of such non-GAAP substitutes suggests that 
the GAAP pension expense was not perceived as useful by at least some users. Against this 
background, the ASU’s mandated rearrangement of pension cost components could simply 
bring GAAP numbers in line with non-GAAP metrics already computed and used in practice. 
If the benefits of a higher ERR were already stripped out of operating income by users in the 
pre-ASU regime, and if managers correctly perceived that, it begs the question of whether the 
ASU itself will trigger any real response from managers making asset allocation decisions.  
We examine our question with a sample of U.S. DB sponsors, which are subject to the 
ASU, along with to a control sample of Canadian DB sponsors which report under IFRS and 
are hence not subject to the ASU. Using a difference-in-difference research design and entropy 
balancing, we find that affected U.S. firms reduce risk-taking in pension assets after the ASU, 
relative to Canadian firms.  While these base findings are supportive of our prediction, we rely 
on cross-sectional tests to more confidently attribute the reduction in equities to the ASU’s 
reduction of financial reporting benefits from a higher ERR. We motivate cross-sectional tests 
along two dimensions: (1) firms for which the financial reporting benefits of risk-taking, as 
                                                     
5 In particular, Moody’s reverses all pension costs but adds back service cost; attributes interest expense to 
pension-related debt using an interest rate that represents a theoretical average borrowing cost for each issuer 
based on its credit rating; recognizes interest cost in other non-recurring income/expense; and adds or subtracts 
actual losses or gains on pension assets (up to the interest cost) in non-recurring other income/expense. 
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induced by the ERR-based expensing model, were stronger in the first place (pre-ASU); and 
(2) firms for which the ASU reduced those financial reporting benefits more significantly.  
For our first set of cross-sectional tests, we isolate firms that, pre-ASU, had stronger 
incentives to invest in risky assets – and were therefore left with more risky positions to 
“unwind” post-ASU.  We operationalize these incentives with: (i) the ratio of the expected 
return to total pension expense excluding the expected return – i.e., how economically 
significant the expected return (and hence the ERR assumption) is in offsetting the income-
decreasing components of pension expense, (ii) the ratio of the fair value of pension assets to 
operating income – i.e., how much will a given change in ERR affect operating income (by 
virtue of being multiplied by the fair value of pension assets). Consistent with expectation, we 
find that the reduction in equities is concentrated among firms where the expected return 
component is economically significant to pension expense and where the ERR is a powerful 
lever with which to boost reported income.  
In our second set of cross-sectional tests, we isolate firms for which the ASU’s 
particular relocation reduced the financial reporting benefits of risk-taking more significantly. 
Intuitively, we would expect the benefits of boosting the ERR to be particularly affected for 
those firms for which operating income is more important as a summary metric of performance. 
Accordingly, we partition on (i) firms for which analysts explicitly forecast operating income, 
and (ii) firms for which the operating income is more value-relevant relative to net income.  
We then isolate the significant reduction in equity investments to these groups. Collectively, 
both sets of cross-sectional tests help us to attribute the reduction in equity allocations to our 
proposed mechanism: an unwinding of risky investments built up in the pre-ASU period 
specifically to help justify a higher ERR, which would in turn boost reported operating income.  
Our study makes several contributions.  First, we contribute to the literature on real 
effects of accounting, which documents that managers undertake actions with cash flow 
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consequences in order to report favorable accounting numbers (Horwitz and Kolodny 1981; 
Choudhary, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 2009; Zhang 2009; Chuk 2013; Anantharaman and 
Chuk 2018).  This literature has focused largely on managerial incentives to report net income; 
we document evidence consistent with firms having undertaken actions with cash flow 
consequences (i.e., investing in riskier assets) at least in part to report favorable operating 
income, while holding constant the incentives to report favorable net income. In other words, 
we document that operating income matters to managers, incrementally to net income.  Finding 
that managers treat operating income as an important metric is particularly interesting in light 
of its status – or lack thereof – in GAAP: despite past agenda projects to “consider whether to 
require the display of summarized amounts such as operating income or income from core 
activities, EBITDA, or operating cash flows” (FASB 2001, Page 2), to date, “current GAAP 
has no definition of operating income or lacks guidance on what should be included in 
operating income” (ASU 2017-07, Paragraph BC21).6    
 Second, we contribute to the literature on location of financial statement line items. One 
strand of this literature shows that managers exercise discretion in locating various line items 
on the financial statements (e.g., reporting a loss as part of special items rather than core 
earnings), often for opportunistic reasons (McVay 2006; Lee, Petroni and Shen 2006; Curtis, 
McVay, and Whipple 2014; Gordon, Henry, Jorgensen, and Linthicum 2017).  Another strand, 
closer to our own, examines GAAP-mandated changes in the location of specific financial 
statement line items (e.g., a rule change that relocates early debt extinguishments from 
extraordinary items to earnings before income taxes, as in Bartov and Mohanram 2014). These 
studies focus primarily on how mandated “relocation” of an item affects opportunistic 
                                                     
6 Given the lack of a technical definition of operating income, ASU 2017-07 requires “an entity to present the 
other components of net benefit cost [other than service cost] outside a subtotal of income from operations, if 
one is presented…  If a subtotal of income from operations is not presented, the entity will have discretion to 
present the other components of net benefit cost wherever it is appropriate in the income statement” (ASU 2017-
07, Paragraph BC20). 
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management of that item, and market perceptions thereof through outcomes such as value 
relevance, earnings response coefficients, and analyst forecast errors (Bartov and Mohanram 
2014; Luo, Shao, and Zhang 2018; Kang, Lin, and Yeung 2019). In a point of departure from 
this work, we directly examine the “real” effects of GAAP-mandated relocation. Cohen, Katz, 
Mutlu, and Sadka 2019 also document the real effects of higher leverage in response to 
mandated relocation of minority interests from liabilities (or mezzanine) to shareholders’ 
equity. Our study is in a similar spirit to theirs, with the key difference that our setting relocates 
components on the income statement, rather than the balance sheet. 
 Third, our findings have an interesting parallel to Anantharaman and Chuk’s (2018) 
findings that pension risk-taking declined upon IFRS’ adoption of IAS 19R, which removed 
the ERR assumption altogether from net income.7 The reporting changes implemented by each 
standard-setter fundamentally differ – the IASB removed the expected return component from 
net income altogether (a measurement change), whereas the FASB simply relocates it out of 
operating income (a presentation change). Nonetheless, both actions appear to engender 
reductions in any tilt that pension portfolios had towards risky investments. Collectively, they 
provide evidence from very different settings both pointing to the broader conclusion that 
financial reporting – specifically, income statement benefits – are a driver of pension asset 
allocation choices, a conjecture long held by pension experts (Zion and Carache 2002, 2005; 
Gold 2005).  
 The rest of our paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the institutional 
background on the regulation and develops hypotheses.  Section III describes our data and 
research design.  Section IV reports empirical results.  Section V summarizes and concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
                                                     
7 IAS 19 (Revised) Pension Benefits. Under IAS 19R, pension costs are now offset by an expected return 
calculated not based on an ERR, but rather based on the plan’s discount rate, which in turn is based on high-
quality corporate bond yields. This change was motivated in part by increasing concerns over ERR inflation.  
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The extant pension expense model  
Starting from the issuance of SFAS 87 in 1985,8 pension expense on sponsoring firms’ 
income statements is composed of the core “operating” cost of pensions – the service cost (i.e., 
the cost of additional benefits earned by participants for one more year of service), and the 
interest cost (the cost of carrying the liability, arising from benefits’ being discounted by one 
less year), offset by the returns earned by pension assets. Under the “smoothing” model of 
pension expense adopted by SFAS 87, service costs and interest costs are offset by expected 
(not actual) returns on pension assets, computed as the fair value of pension assets multiplied 
by an ERR assumption.9  
Real effects of the ERR-based pension expense model 
The ERR assumption is left to managers’ discretion, with FASB guidance that it must 
be based on the expected returns of the asset portfolio.10 As higher-risk assets bring higher 
expected returns on average, shifting pension portfolios towards riskier assets can help to 
justify higher ERR assumptions, which in turn reduce pension expense and boost reported net 
income. At the same time, the cost of investing in those riskier assets – namely, higher volatility 
in actual returns – is not borne on the income statement. In a nutshell, the ERR-based 
accounting model does not symmetrically reflect the expected costs and benefits of risk-taking– 
                                                     
8 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No: 87: Employers’ Accounting for Pensions (FASB 
1985).  
9 The difference between expected and actual returns is a part of “actuarial gains and losses” (hereafter, “AGLs”), 
which are recognized in other comprehensive income (OCI), in essence a dirty-surplus item. These AGLs, which 
include not only differences between actual and expected return but also differences between actuals and estimates 
of other actuarial assumptions (discount rates, mortality rates, salary growth rates, etc.), can move in offsetting 
directions and are all recognized in the aggregate in OCI. If this pool of accumulated AGLs exceeds a threshold, 
or ‘‘corridor’’—currently 10 percent of the larger of the projected benefit obligation (PBO) and fair value of plan 
assets—it must then be amortized into net income (or ‘‘recycled’’) over the remaining average expected service 
life of beneficiaries. As a result, actual returns are recognized eventually in net income, but only through the 
recycling process, which usually occurs at a ‘‘glacial’’ pace, if at all (Picconi 2006), under U.S. GAAP. 
10 SFAS 87, Paragraph 45: “The expected long-term rate of return on plan assets shall reflect the average rate of 
earnings expected on the funds invested or to be invested to provide for the benefits included in the projected 
benefit obligation. In estimating that rate, appropriate consideration should be given to the returns being earned 
by the plan assets in the fund and the rates of return expected to be available for reinvestment.”  
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it “highlights the rewards of equity but obscures the risks” (Frieman et al. 2005), and could 
hence tilt managers towards more risk-taking in pension portfolios than they would have 
undertaken otherwise.  
Prior studies have documented evidence consistent with this purported effect, both 
within the ERR-based accounting regime and in settings involving changes out of that regime. 
Within the ERR-based regime in the U.S., Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) and Chuk 
(2013) provide evidence that managers seeking the income boost from a higher ERR also take 
the real actions of increasing risky asset allocations in their pension plans; this leaves us with 
the inference that the pension portfolios of firms seeking an income boost are riskier than they 
would have been in the absence of ERR-based pension expensing. Anantharaman and Chuk 
(2018) provide the most direct evidence informing on the ERR-based accounting model itself, 
investigating the IFRS shift that removed the ERR altogether from net income. They predict, 
and find, that once the ERR assumption no longer affects reported net income under IAS 19R, 
the affected firms pull back on risky investments – suggesting that ERR-based accounting 
induced at least some portfolio tilt toward risk.  
Removal of pension cost components from operating income under ASU 2017-07, and its 
real effects 
With ASU 2017-07, the FASB has undertaken its first major change to pension 
accounting on the income statement since SFAS 87. The ASU alters the presentation of pension 
expense on the income statement, in two ways. First, it requires pension expense to be 
disaggregated into service cost and all non-service cost components. Second, it requires service 
cost to be reported in the same line item as other compensation costs arising from services 
rendered by employees during the period; typically, these will include salaries and bonuses, 
and would be reported as an operating cost. All non-service cost components of pension 
expense – this includes interest costs, the expected return on pension assets, amortization of 
actuarial gains/losses and prior service costs, and other items such as net gains/losses on 
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curtailments and settlements – are to be reported separately and outside operating income, if 
operating income is reported separately on the income statement. Importantly, no new 
information is disclosed as a result of this disaggregation: all pension expense components 
were previously required to be individually disclosed on the pension footnote, per SFAS 87. 
Appendix A details the reporting changes mandated by ASU 2017-07.   
Under the ASU, the ERR assumption continues to affect net income, but no longer 
affects operating income. Prior to the ASU, raising the ERR would boost both operating 
income and net income; after the ASU, raising the ERR boosts only net income while keeping 
operating income unchanged.  
As a result, ASU 2017-07 reduces the financial reporting benefits of inflating the 
expected return component, which (along with several other components) is relegated from 
“above the line” of operating income to “below the line”.  To the extent that firms were 
investing in risky pension assets to garner financial reporting benefits prior to ASU 2017-07 
(i.e., of justifying a higher ERR and boosting the expected return component), those financial 
reporting benefits to investing in risky pension assets are reduced after ASU 2017-07.  Thus, 
we predict some “unwinding” of those risky investments after ASU 2017-07’s reduction of 
those financial reporting benefits. Our main prediction follows:   
H1: Firms affected by ASU 2017-07 will reduce risk-taking in pension asset 
 allocations following the adoption of ASU 2017-07. 
 Note that many other costs and benefits also drive pension asset allocation to riskier 
versus safer assets. For example, sponsors could invest in riskier assets (such as equities) as 
their greater expected returns allow benefits to be provided more cheaply in the long-run, or 
because equities provide a better hedge against real salary increases, or to maximize the value 
of the put option provided by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insurance (Rauh, 2009; 
Sharpe, 1976). Sponsors could invest in safer assets (such as bonds) for tax arbitrage reasons 
(Black 1980, Tepper 1981, Frank 2002) or to better match pension assets with the bond-like 
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nature of benefit obligations. The ASU does not alter any of these economic costs or benefits, 
but only potentially reduces the financial reporting benefits to investing in riskier assets.  
Another way to think of the ASU’s effects is by considering sponsors’ trade-offs to 
investing in equities: investing in equities brings many benefits described above, but also 
entails costs, primarily that of greater volatility in funding and hence in cash contribution 
requirements into plans. Unpredictable cash flows required to be diverted into pension funding 
can play havoc with sponsors’ ability to proceed with their investment agenda (e.g., Rauh 
2006).11 Given these costs, any reduction in the financial reporting benefits to risk-taking could, 
at the margin, make those risky investments less attractive to sponsors.  
Does ASU 2017-07 reduce the financial reporting benefits of a higher ERR?  
 Some fundamental questions on financial statement presentation and its consequences 
underpin our prediction, and act as sources of empirical tension. A key assumption underlying 
H1 is that the financial reporting benefits of a higher ERR have declined under the ASU, as a 
higher expected return no longer boosts operating income (even while continuing to boost net 
income).  
 Justifying this assumption is a stream of research on how investor perceptions are 
affected by the relative position of line items on the income statement. Generally, the closer an 
item is to the topline (sales revenues), the more permanent investors perceive it as, with 
correspondingly higher value-relevance (e.g., Lipe 1986, Bradshaw and Sloan 2002, Fairfield 
et al. 1996, Ohlson and Penman 1992). Conversely, the lower down an item is on the income 
statement – the very direction in which the pension expected return has now moved – the more 
transitory investors perceive it as, with correspondingly lower value-relevance. Moreover, 
managers respond to these distinctions by e.g., shifting expenses out of core earnings into 
                                                     
11 CFOs have been known to describe DB plans as a “volatile debt” that they are forced to carry on their balance 
sheets (Shumsky, 2018), which “consistently defies planning and budgeting exercises” – see 
https://buck.com/losing-sleep-over-pension-financials-not-these-cfos-heres-why/.   
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(lower down) special items, implying that they are aware of the differential valuation 
implications of varying line-item location. Bartov and Mohanram (2014) get closest to clean 
inference on these implications, in their study of SFAS 145, which moved gains/losses from 
early debt extinguishment out of extraordinary items, i.e., below-the-line of net income, to 
above-the-line of net income (before extraordinary items). They document that investors react 
more strongly to these gains/losses when they are reported above-the-line, broadly consistent 
with higher-level placement of an income statement item increasing its value-relevance, even 
though the economic content of the item may be unchanged.  
 Furthermore, analysts and investors have increasingly focused on performance 
measures other than GAAP net income – variously labeled “core” / “proforma” / “operating” 
income or “Street” earnings; managers have increasingly provided such measures voluntarily 
(e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). Even the FASB warns against “focusing attention almost 
exclusively on ‘the bottom line’”.12 The objective of such proforma measures calculated by 
analysts and managers, presumably, is to approximate a “core” earnings that better reflects 
sustainable, ongoing performance. The fact that these measures typically exclude non-
recurring, presumably transitory items as well as other items considered “non-operating” 
suggests that operating income better approximates “core” earnings than does net income. The 
widespread prevalence and value-relevance of such measures implies, at the minimum, that 
investors find metrics of operating income (or variants thereof) decision-relevant.  
 More specific to our setting, operating income in itself has been shown to be a useful 
metric for investors’ decision-making, notwithstanding the general focus on net income. 
Barton, Hansen, and Pownall (2010) compare many summary measures of performance for 
46 countries including the U.S. – from sales revenues to operating income to net income to 
                                                     
12 The FASB continues with “The individual items, subtotals, or other parts of a financial statement may often 
be more useful than the aggregate to those who make investment, credit, and similar decisions” (FASB Concept 
Statement No. 5, Paragraph 22).” 
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comprehensive income – and document that value-relevance tends to peak as one moves 
towards the “middle” of the income statement (to operating income, and variants thereof). 
Operating income could also matter from a contracting perspective – Ittner, Larcker, 
and Rajan (1997) document that it is one of the most commonly-used performance metrics in 
CEO annual bonus contracts, along with net income and EPS; Huang, Li, and Ng (2013) 
confirm this in a much larger and more recent sample.13  
In sum, there are many reasons to believe that operating income is regarded as a useful 
metric by market participants and contracting parties; managers, in turn, focus on the metrics 
that are widely used.14 Hence, the desire to boost operating income – for valuation and/or 
contracting purposes – could have incentivized managers to increase risk in pension portfolios 
prior to the ASU. As those incentives no longer exist, some unwinding of pension risk could 
result.  
 Some key countervailing forces still remain. First, unlike IAS 19R – which removes 
the effect of the ERR entirely from the income statement, under ASU 2017-07 the ERR 
continues to have the ability to boost net income. Notwithstanding the growing use of non-
GAAP earnings measures, the importance of net income in firm valuation remains indisputable, 
and it continues to be widely used in contracting. Therefore, it remains an open question 
whether the ASU’s reduction of the financial reporting benefits of pension risk-taking are 
substantial enough to trigger unwinding of risky asset allocations, the expected-return effects 
of which can after all still flow into – and benefit – net income.  
                                                     
13 Guay, Kepler, and Tsui (2016) also document that CEO bonus plans typically incorporate multiple performance 
measures, including 1-2 earnings-based measures on average, ranging from net income to operating income to 
higher-level subtotals and scaled return-type measures. They do not, however, provide statistics on the relative 
usage of each measure.  
14 A stream of research has documented evidence of earnings management in performance metrics that are widely 
used by stakeholders and—just as importantly—a  lack of evidence of earnings management in performance 
metrics that are not widely used by stakeholders (Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna 2003; Jacob and Jorgensen 2007; 
Jorgensen, Lee, and Rock 2014; Burgstahler and Chuk 2015, 2017). 
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 Second, we note here that pension expense has been disaggregated component-by-
component in the pension footnote since SFAS 87, and that even prior to ASU 2017-07, some 
sophisticated financial statement users were computing proforma measures of pension cost by 
re-arranging and/or re-measuring certain pension cost components (Standard & Poor’s 2003; 
Moody’s 2006; Moody’s 2016, ASU 2017-07 Paragraph BC12). Many of these users 
commented in the exposure process leading up to ASU 2017-07 that their proforma adjustments 
to pension expense (and in turn to operating income) were very similar to what the FASB 
proposed and eventually issued as authoritative guidance in ASU 2017-07. To the extent that 
managers believed, pre-ASU, that financial statement users were already removing expected 
returns from operating income, then they would have relatively low incentives to take real 
actions – such as increase pension risk – specifically in order to boost operating income. And 
in that scenario, we would not then expect the passage of the ASU – which simply mandates a 
rearrangement that mimics the numbers already used in practice – to significantly alter 
managerial behavior with respect to pension asset allocations. 
 Finally, pre-ASU 2017-07 accounting rules need not have incentivized all firms to 
increase risk-taking similarly.  Prior to ASU 2017-07, inflating the expected return component 
was likely to have been more effective for some firms, relative to others, at boosting reported 
operating income.  Hence, the risk-taking induced by the desire to boost operating income for 
these firms was also likely higher prior to ASU 2017-07. We expect that these firms experience 
a correspondingly greater “unwinding” of risky asset allocations post-ASU 2017-07. 
Accordingly, we exploit cross-sectional variation in how effectively the ERR could boost 
operating income to offer a further prediction:  
H2: The reduction in risk-taking in pension assets after ASU 2017-07 will be more 
 pronounced for firms for whom inflating the expected return component was 
 more effective at increasing operating income prior to ASU 2017-07. 
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Following a similar logic, the ASU’s “unwinding” of the financial reporting benefits of 
risk-taking is likely to have been stronger for some firms than for others. To put it simply, if 
operating income really “mattered” to a firm pre-ASU (and managers perceived that correctly), 
then the ASU’s relocation of expected return out of operating income likely reduced the 
financial reporting benefits of risk-taking more for that firm. Conversely, if operating income 
is not a salient metric (for valuation or contracting) – because instead, say, net income is the 
dominant measure of interest for that firm – then, the ASU may not have substantially reduced 
the financial reporting benefits of risk-taking for that firm. We would expect a correspondingly 
greater “unwinding” of risk-taking for the former, rather than the latter, firm. Our third 
hypothesis follows:  
H3: The reduction in risk-taking in pension assets after ASU 2017-07 will be more 
 pronounced for firms for whom the financial reporting benefits of risk-taking 
 are reduced more by the ASU.  
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Constructing a treatment sample of U.S. firms  
 Table 1 outlines the sample selection process. We start by identifying all U.S. firms 
with DB pensions that are represented in Compustat North America for the last fiscal period 
before ASU 2017-07 and the first fiscal period under ASU 2017-07. As ASU 2017-07 became 
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2017, for December fiscal year-end 
firms this translates into fiscal years 2017 (pre-ASU) and 2018 (ASU) respectively. We obtain 
annual reports for these firms from the SEC website, giving us an initial sample of 1,328 firms.  
We hand-collect the detailed pension asset allocations, ERRs, and discount rates from 
annual reports for the two-year time period extending from the last fiscal period before 
adoption of ASU 2017-07 to the first fiscal period post-adoption. We lose 498 firms due to 
missing data required for our model variables. We also lose 80 firms that do not have sufficient 
data in both the pre- and post-periods.  Finally, we remove four firms that are voluntary early 
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adopters of the provisions in the ASU, given that changes in managerial behavior (if any) for 
early adopters would likely have occurred prior to our time window.  Our final sample of 746 
U.S. firms translates to 1,492 firm-years for the U.S. “treatment” sample.  
Selecting a control sample of Canadian firms  
To make reliable inferences about the effects of ASU 2017-07 and to rule out 
macroeconomic or over-time influences, we choose a control sample of Canadian listed firms 
that sponsor DB pension plans. Canadian firms are geographically proximate to U.S. firms and 
share a similar capital markets environment, but are presumably unaffected by ASU 2017-07, 
as Canadian firms have reported under IFRS since around 2013. Importantly, the measurement 
and presentation of pension expense components under IFRS underwent no alterations during 
the time window we examine. Under IAS 19R, there is no specific mandate as to where pension 
cost components should be presented on the balance sheet or even whether the components 
must be presented separately; firms are allowed to choose a presentation approach under the 
expectation that it is consistently applied. For all these reasons, we believe that Canadian firms 
offer an appropriate control sample to evaluate the treatment effects of ASU 2017-07. We use 
entropy balancing when estimating the effects of ASU 2017-07.   
We rely on Compustat North America for financial and pension data on Canadian firms; 
we find 198 Canadian firms that sponsor DB pensions.  We lose 49 firms due to missing data 
for model variables and 10 firms that do not have sufficient data in both periods.  Our final 
sample of 139 Canadian firms translates to 278 firm-years for the Canadian control sample.   
We obtain annual reports for these firms from Canada’s online repository of public 
company filings, SEDAR, supplemented by hand-collection from company websites.  We 
hand-collect detailed pension asset allocations, ERRs, and discount rates from Canadian annual 
reports for the same two-year time period as for the treatment sample. We convert all numbers 
from CAD to USD using the exchange rate at the fiscal year-end.   
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Specification to test the consequences of ASU 2017-07  
We identify the overall effect of ASU 2017-07 with a difference-in-differences (DD) 
specification, which compares pre- and post-ASU 2017-07 shifts in asset allocation of U.S. 
firms affected by ASU 2017-07, to shifts over the same time in asset allocations of Canadian 
control firms. We employ the following OLS specification:  
%EQUITIES (or %FIXED INCOME) = β0 + β1 POST + β2 US + β3 POST*US + Σ Controls 
+ FIRM FE + ε (Equation 1) 
The dependent variable %EQUITIES captures the proportion of pension assets invested 
in equity and equity-like securities, and is hand-collected from the detailed asset allocation 
disclosures on annual reports of U.S. and Canadian sponsors. We also estimate an alternative 
version of Eq. (1) with %FIXED INCOME – the proportion of pension assets invested in 
relatively safe instruments, i.e., fixed-income securities. We hand-collect these allocations to 
better capture the richness and complexity of these disclosures, which are not fully reflected 
on Compustat Pensions (Anantharaman and Chuk 2020).  
US is a firm-level indicator set to one (zero) for U.S. (Canadian) firms. POST is an 
indictor set to one for firm-years under ASU 2017-07, and to zero for firm-years ending before 
the ASU became effective. Our key variable of interest is the DD estimator on the interaction 
POST*US, which captures the incremental change in asset allocations of U.S. pension plans, 
relative to Canadian plans. 
Our control variables capture cross-sectional determinants of asset allocations, 
motivated by prior research. We control for sponsor size (SIZE) as larger sponsors have wider 
investment opportunities. Firms with tighter debt covenants or with a tradition of paying 
dividends have stronger incentives to minimize volatility in pension returns (and consequently 
in funded status or required contributions), so as to avoid breaching covenants or to preserve 
the cash flows needed to pay dividends. Accordingly, we control for closeness to covenant 
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thresholds with leverage (LEVERAGE), and for dividend-paying status (DIVIDENDS). Firms 
with volatile operating cash flows would also have an incentive to minimize volatility in 
pension returns (and consequently in required contributions), motivating cash flow volatility 
(SDCF) as a control variable. Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) argue that tax-paying firms have 
an incentive to borrow on the corporate balance sheet, fund their plans and invest plan assets 
in the most highly taxed securities – bonds.15 This “tax arbitrage” argument suggests that high 
tax-paying firms invest more in bonds. We incorporate an indicator variable set to one if the 
firm has net operating loss carryforwards (NOL), to capture the firm’s tax-paying status.  
 Amongst plan-level characteristics, we control for funding ratio (FUND RATIO) and 
the square thereof (FUND RATIO2), as prior research hypothesizes that very overfunded and 
very underfunded plans – in an attempt to minimize contribution volatility – tend to invest in 
bonds, while moderately funded plans increase equity investments to earn their way out of 
underfunding (Bader 1991, Amir and Benartzi 1999). We control for plan horizon (HORIZON, 
measured as the natural logarithm of PBO/service cost), as longer-horizon plans (with younger 
beneficiaries) should invest more in equities to hedge against salary increases (Rauh 2009). 
Finally, not all sponsors rebalance allocations to target period-by-period; hence, equity 
investments can grow as a proportion of total plan assets in years when equity markets perform 
well. To control for passive growth in equity investments, we include the broad-based 
performance of global equity markets, with returns to the S&P Global Broad Market Index for 
equities (MARKET RETURNS).16  We also control for firm fixed-effects. We cluster standard 
errors at the firm level. Appendix B provides detailed variable definitions.   
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
                                                     
15 This strategy helps to maximize shareholder value as sponsors can then deduct interest off the corporate tax 
return but accrue interest tax-free on the bonds held inside the pension trust. 
16 As a result of less-than-perfect rebalancing, in a year in which the equity markets perform well, equity 
allocations can grow for all sponsors (and vice-versa if the equity markets do not perform well). As our DD 
specification involves comparisons across time, overall equity market performance in each time period hence 
becomes an important factor that needs to be controlled for. 
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Descriptive statistics of model variables for the U.S. sample (treatment group) 
Table 2 describes model variables, with Panel A (Panel B) describing the U.S. sample 
pre- (post-) ASU 2017-07. Equities are the largest category on average for U.S. plans pre-ASU 
2017-07, with mean (median) investment of 40.4% (43.2%) of pension assets. We observe a 
marked downward shift in %EQUITIES after ASU 2017-07, to a mean (median) of 34.8% 
(36%) . Notably, the entire distribution of %EQUITIES appears to shift downwards – the 25th 
percentile declines from 25.3% to 16.8%, and the 75th percentile declines from 57.6% to 52%.  
 Fixed income securities, the second largest category for U.S. plans, display a 
corresponding upswing along the entire distribution – the mean (median) investment in fixed 
income securities (%FIXED INCOME) increases from 40.6% (38.6%) to 45.3% (42.9%), with 
the 25th percentile increasing from 27.7% to 31.4%, and the 75th percentile increasing from 
51.7% to 58.3%.  Unsurprisingly, ERRs also decline from 6.2% (6.50%) to 5.97% (6.25%).  
The market value of firm equity starts out at $14.9bn ($3.5bn) in the pre-period, 
dropping marginally to about $13.8bn ($2.9bn) in the post-period. Similarly, the fair value of 
plan assets, which is $1.7bn ($297.8m) in the pre-period, drops slightly to $1.6bn ($272.6m) 
in the post-period. Funding ratios, however, remain steady at 83.6% (84.2%) in the pre-period 
and 83.2% (83.5%) in the post-period. Other fundamentals such as leverage, dividends, cash 
flow volatility, loss carryforwards, and plan horizon do not exhibit noteworthy trends across 
periods.  Market returns are on average positive in the pre-period, and on average negative in 
the post-period.  
Descriptive statistics of model variables for the Canadian sample (control group) 
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 3 describes the Canadian sample pre- (post-) ASU 2017-07. 
%EQUITIES has an interquartile range of 31%-59% in the pre-period (broadly similar to the 
U.S. sample), with a mean (median) of 43% (46%), slightly higher than the U.S. sample. The 
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mean (median) of %EQUITIES drops to 39.1% (41%) post-ASU; %FIXED INCOME starts 
out at 40.7% (39%) – very similar to the U.S. sample, and increases to 43.2% (42%).  
Figure 1 graphically represents the mean and median values of %EQUITY for the U.S. 
and Canadian samples in the pre- and post-periods.  We note that both samples experience a 
reduction in equity holdings, likely due to the poor performance of global equity markets in 
2018. However, importantly, the change in %EQUITIES appears more negative for U.S. firms.  
Overall, the broadly similar shifts in asset allocations across U.S. and Canada highlight the 
importance of our DD research design, where potential common macro-economic trends are 
differenced away. We discuss this specification next.  
Difference-in-differences tests of the effect of ASU 2017-07 
 In Table 4, we present results of estimating the DD specification of Equation (1) with 
U.S. and Canadian firms, pre- and post-ASU 2017-07. To more confidently infer treatment 
effects of the ASU, we implement multivariate matching across U.S. and Canadian samples 
using an entropy balancing approach. Like other multivariate matching approaches (e.g., 
propensity score matching, which is commonly used in accounting and finance studies), the 
goal of entropy balancing is to eliminate differences in covariates across treatment and control 
samples. Entropy balancing, however, has two key conceptual advantages over propensity 
score matching (McMullin and Schonberger 2020): it ensures that higher-order moments of 
covariate distributions are nearly identical across treatment and control samples; and it does 
away with the many researcher choices that are necessary for propensity score matching and 
which can greatly influence the results thereof. McMullin and Schonberger (2020) highlight 
that entropy balancing has particular strengths in settings where the outcome variable is a non-
linear function of the underlying controls – a feature applicable to our setting, where asset 
allocation has long been understood to be non-linearly affected by plan funding (Bader 1991, 
Amir and Benartzi 1999, Anantharaman and Lee 2013). Entropy balancing also offers the 
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empirical advantage of allowing us to retain our full U.S. and Canadian samples. We provide 
details of the entropy balancing procedure in Appendix C, with the pre- and post-balancing 
distributional properties of U.S. and Canadian samples summarized in Table C1. Table C1 
shows very similar means for matching variables after entropy balancing.   
 We present results of Eq. (1) without entropy balancing in Table 4, Panel A, and using 
entropy balancing in Panel B.  Columns (1) and (3) [(2) and (4)] display specifications with 
%EQUITIES [%FIXED INCOME] as the dependent variable. The POST indicator is strongly 
significant across Columns (1)-(4), indicating a drop in equity investment to the tune of 3.07%-
3.19% post-ASU for all firms, and an accompanying increase in fixed income investment to 
the tune of 3.23%-3.36%. Importantly, our main coefficient of interest, US*POST, is negative 
and significant at the <0.05 level in specifications with %EQUITIES, while positive and 
significant at the <0.01 level in specifications with %FIXED INCOME. The coefficients on 
US*POST indicate that after controlling for various determinants of asset allocation, U.S. firms 
reduce equity allocations post-ASU by 1.58%-2.20% more than Canadian firms, and increase 
fixed-income allocations by 2.16%-2.60% more than Canadian firms, on average. As U.S. 
firms are affected by ASU 2017-07 whereas Canadian firms are presumably unaffected, this 
provides direct evidence consistent with H1 that ASU 2017-07 engenders risk reduction.  
Cross-sectional variation in the financial reporting benefits of risk-taking 
 The DD research design helps to a large extent in ruling out omitted variables concerns 
arising from permanent, time-invariant differences across U.S. and Canada, or global 
macroeconomic trends or market movements affecting both countries. In order for our results 
to be explained by an omitted variable, the omitted variable would have to time-vary 
contemporaneously with ASU 2017-07 implementation, and affect U.S. and Canadian plans 
differently. Nevertheless, to further verify that U.S. risk-reduction is attributable to ASU 2017-
07, we examine cross-sectional partitions varying the expected strength of the ASU’s effect. In 
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our first set of partitions, we examine subsamples in which we expect the financial reporting 
benefits of risk-taking to have been most pronounced in the first place, pre-ASU 2017-07. If 
the risk-reduction observed in U.S. plans is truly attributable to our hypothesized mechanism, 
then we would expect the risk-reduction to be stronger for these firms, whose asset allocations 
were presumably more influenced by reporting incentives to begin with (H2).  
 To test H2, we operationalize the strength of the pre-ASU 2017-07 incentives to invest 
in risky assets in order to boost the expected return, using two different proxies. Our first 
measure is the ratio of the expected return component to all other components of pension costs 
(results presented in Table 5). This captures sponsors for which the expected return is an 
economically significant component of pension expense, and is hence more likely to offset the 
other (income-decreasing) pension cost components. Our second measure is the ratio of fair 
value of pension assets to operating income (results presented in Table 6); it captures how 
powerful the ERR is, as a lever to boost operating income (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh 
2006). As the expected return component is calculated as ERR*fair value of ending pension 
assets, any given increase in the ERR has a greater impact on operating income for a firm with 
large pension assets; the ratio of fair value of plan assets / operating income hence captures the 
extent of this multiplier effect. Sponsor with greater multipliers, we assume, have greater 
incentives pre-ASU to boost the ERR.  
 In each of Tables 5 and 6, we partition the sample by median values of each of the three 
measures, resulting in a subsample with high incentives and a subsample with low incentives.  
We separately estimate Equation (1) for each of two resulting subsamples, with Panel A in each 
table reporting the results of estimating Equation (1) for the subsample with high incentives, 
and Panel B reporting results for the subsample with low incentives. Our subsamples display 
economically significant differences along the partitioning variables: median expected returns 
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are 94.5% (54%) of other pension costs for the high (low) subsample; and median plan assets 
to operating income is 2.3 (0.4) for the high (low) subsample.  
 Tables 5 and 6 collectively paint a picture of the reduction in risk-taking being 
concentrated in firms with greater financial reporting benefits to hold risky pension assets prior 
to ASU 2017-07, consistent with H2.  In Tables 5 and 6, the coefficient of interest US*POST 
is significant at the <0.01 level throughout in Panel A for the high incentive subsamples, 
whereas it is not significantly different from zero in Panel B, for the low incentive subsamples. 
The coefficients indicate an incremental reduction in U.S. firms’ equities to the tune of 3.52%, 
and 2.37% in the high-incentive subsamples in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. This translates into 
16.7% and 11.8% respectively of one standard deviation in U.S. %EQUITIES from the pre-
ASU period – indicating economically significant shifts in asset allocation.    
 Collectively, these results present a picture of stronger reductions in equity investment 
for the subsamples of firms that were more subject to the reporting-based risk-taking incentives 
to begin with. As these types of firms likely had larger risky positions to “unwind” after ASU 
2017-07, these cross-sectional patterns help us to isolate the ASU’s reduction of reported-based 
incentives as being a driving factor behind the results we observe.  
Cross-sectional variation in the ASU’s unwinding of the financial reporting benefits of 
risk-taking 
 In our second set of cross-sectional partitions, we hone in specifically on the strength 
of the ASU’s purported effect, of reducing the financial reporting benefits of risk-taking. If the 
reduction in risk-taking is specifically attributable to the ASU’s shift of expected return out of 
operating income and solely into net income, we would expect a larger effect for firms for 
which operating income was particularly important as a summary metric of performance – and 
for which the financial reporting benefits of a higher expected return (in that operating income) 
have hence declined more significantly.  
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We operationalize the importance of operating income as a summary metric with two 
proxies. First, we isolate firms for which at least one analyst (on the I/B/E/S database) issues 
an explicit forecast of operating income. Analyst focus on operating income is interesting for 
multiple reasons – it could indicate firms for which the operating income is an intrinsically 
more useful summary performance measure, relative to net income (for reasons associated with 
firm fundamentals, industry fundamentals, or firm reporting behavior).17 Furthermore, 
analysts’ focus on operating income could in turn engender greater attention to that metric from 
other investors and market participants. Second, we directly examine the decision-usefulness 
of operating income, relative to net income, for equity investors’ valuation. To gauge this, we 
estimate firm-specific regressions of price on operating income, and of price on net income, 
and partition firms by the ratio of the R2s from these two models, which serves as our measure 
of the relative value-relevance of operating income versus net income.  
We present these results in Table 7 (analysts’ forecasts of operating income) and Table 
8 (value-relevance of operating income relative to net income). In Table 7, about 45% of our 
sample firm-years have at least one analyst forecast of operating income. In untabulated 
estimations for Table 8, we find that the R2s from models of price on operating income are 
consistently higher than from models of price on net income – the mean R2 from operating 
income (net income) models is 23.2% (14%) while the median R2 is 15% (7.86%), with very 
similar statistics across U.S. and Canadian samples. The median R2 of operating income 
relative to net income is 5.3 for the high subsample, versus 0.6 for the low subsample.   
The subsample results in Tables 7 and 8 are broadly consistent with our expectations: 
in both cases, the US*POST interaction is significant at the <0.05 level for the predicted 
subsample (with analysts’ forecasts for operating income, and higher value-relevance of, 
                                                     
17 Prior research on analyst forecasting decisions suggests that analysts respond to market participants’ demand 
for value-relevant information when choosing to provide forecasts of additional summary metrics of firm 
performance (e.g., Brown and Sivakumar 2003, DeFond and Hung 2003).  
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operating income). The difference in coefficients on the interaction across subsamples is not 
statistically significant for Table 7, but is significant for Table 8. The coefficients indicate an 
incremental reduction in U.S. firms’ equities to the tune of 2.51% among firms with analysts’ 
operating income forecasts, and 2.61% among firms with high value-relevance of operating 
income. These effects translate to 13% and 12.1% respectively of one standard deviation of 
U.S. equities.   
Collectively, these cross-sectional results provide further evidence that helps us to 
attribute the risk-reduction specifically to ASU 2017-07’s removal of expected return benefits 
from operating income.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 Following an accounting rule change (ASU 2017-07) in the U.S. that mandates the 
relocation of the expected return on pension assets out of operating income, we document a 
reduction in affected U.S. firms’ investment in riskier pension assets, relative to a control 
sample of Canadian firms that report under IFRS and are hence unaffected by the mandate. We 
infer from this that the pre-ASU financial statement presentation – wherein expected returns 
flowed into operating income – incentivized pension sponsors to invest in riskier assets. This 
inference is supported by cross-sectional tests demonstrating that the reduction in risk-taking 
is concentrated in sponsors (1) for which the financial reporting incentives for risk-taking, pre-
ASU, were stronger to begin with, and (2) for which the ASU particularly reduced those 
financial reporting benefits. Building on prior work (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh 2006; Chuk 
2013; Anantharaman and Chuk 2018), these findings point to the expected returns-based 
accounting and financial reporting model as a key driver of pension risk-taking.  
 The particular setting we examine – ASU 2017-07 – also allows the opportunity to gain 
insights into which performance metrics “matter”, and specifically, does operating income 
matter incrementally to net income? Mechanically, operating income is a subtotal of net 
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income, such that any earnings component that is a part of operating income is, by construction, 
also included in net income.  Thus, it is generally not possible to determine whether managerial 
actions undertaken to report a favorable number for such an earnings component are driven by 
incentives to report favorable operating income specifically, as opposed to incentives to report 
favorable net income. Our setting moves us closer to such inference.  While net income – the 
bottom line on the income statement – is indisputably relevant for valuation and contracting, 
our findings imply that at least some of the pension risk-taking observed in the pre-ASU era 
were in the interest of reporting higher operating income. If stakeholders use operating income 
as a measure of core earnings, which reflects sustainable performance going forward, then 
managers could be responding to those perceptions by focusing in turn on operating income. 
 Perhaps the most surprising aspect of our findings is that U.S. GAAP, to date, has not 
formally defined operating income or formulated any rules for how operating income should 
be measured.  Nor does U.S. GAAP require the disclosure of operating income in a multi-step 
income statement.  Given the lack of guidance from the FASB for a metric to measure income 
from sustainable performance going forward, several non-GAAP measures—such as EBIT and 
EBITDA—have been contenders to fill that void in recent years.  However, despite the rising 
popularity of non-GAAP earnings metrics, our findings demonstrate that operating income – 
as reported on the income statement – still matters to managers. Or at the very least, managers 
believe that operating income matters to financial statement users. 
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Appendix A 
Description of Reporting Changes Mandated by ASU 2017-07 
 
 ASU 2017-07 under US GAAP became effective for fiscal periods beginning after 
December 15, 2017. Its main provisions require employers to report: (1) the service cost 
component of periodic pension cost in the same line item or items as other compensation costs 
arising from services rendered by the pertinent employees during the period, as part of 
operating income and (2) the other components of pension cost (besides service cost) separately 
from the service cost component and outside a subtotal of income from operations, if such a 
subtotal is presented.  The FASB acknowledges that an entity may use a variety of presentations 
and subtotals on the face of the income statement, and therefore operating income is not always 
presented as a subtotal on the income statement.  If operating income is not presented on the 
income statement, ASU 2017-07 allows the entity to have discretion to present the other 
components of pension cost other than service cost wherever it is appropriate in the income 
statement (ASU 2017-07, Paragraph BC20). 
 The FASB’s reasoning for requiring the separation of service cost from the other 
components is that service cost is the component that exclusively originates from employee 
services during the current period, and potentially has a significantly different effect in terms 
of information usefulness to financial statement users. Below is a summary of the change in 
reporting requirements under ASU 2017-07 for each of the major components of pension cost, 
along with the resulting effects of whether the change increases or decreases reported operating 
income: 






Direction of effect of 
ASU 2017-07 on 
operating income 
Service cost Yes Yes No change 
Interest cost Yes No Increase 
Expected return Yes No Decrease 
Amortization of 
gains/losses 
Yes No Increase for losses 
Decrease for gains 
Amortization of 
prior service cost 
Yes No Increase 













% Fixed Income Percentage of pension assets invested in fixed income securities  10-K 
% Equities Percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities  10-K 
ERR  Expected rate of return 10-k 




This indicator variable is set to 1 for fiscal years ending on or after Dec 15th, 
2018 and set to 0 for fiscal years ending Dec 15th, 2017 to Dec 14th 2018.   
US This indicator variable is set to 1 for US firms, and 0 for Canadian firms  
Horizon  
 
Investment horizon, measured as the natural log of the ratio of PBO to current 
service cost. If current service cost is 0 or blank,  we replace the service cost by 
a small value of 0.000001 pbpro, pbpru, svc 
Actual Returns ($Million) Current-year actual dollar return on pension assets  pbarat 




Three-year average of ARR  ending in the current year; where ARR is the 
current-year actual dollar return on pension assets scaled by beginning pension 
assets  pbarat, pplao, pplau 
Discount rate interest cost (%) Discount rate used to compute pension expense ppcr, ppcrmax 
FVPA  ($ Million) Fair value of plan assets at the end of the period 10-k 
PBO ($ Million) Projected benefit obligation at the end of the period 10-k 
Fund Ratio  
Funding ratio obtained from 10-k data, measured as the fair value of plan 
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Independent Variables – Firm Characteristics 
SDCF ($Million) 
 
Operating risk, measured as the standard deviation of the ratio of cash flow 
from operations to book value of equity for five years, ending in the current 
year oancf, bkvlps, csho 
Market Returns 
 
12-month returns to S&P Global Broad Market Index for equities 
https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/equity/sp-
global-bmi/#overview  
Market Cap ($Million) 
Market capitalization. It is the product of year-end share price and number of 
ordinary shares outstanding prcc_f, csho 
Size  Natural log of market cap prcc_f, csho 
Leverage ($Million) Ratio of long-term debt to total assets dltt, at 
NOL ($ Million) 
It takes the value of 1 if prior period has a tax loss carry forward. Else, NOL 
takes the value of zero tlcf 










This indicator variable is set equal to one when the ratio of expected return to 
all other components of pension cost is greater than the median, and set equal 
to zero otherwise.   
 
The ratio of expected return to all other components of pension cost  is 
computed as (-1) * Dollar value of expected return divided by the value of all 
components of pension cost. 
Expected return in $ = pprpa 











This indicator variable is set equal to one when the ratio of fair value of plan 
assets to operating income is greater than the median, and set equal to zero 
otherwise.  If operating income is negative, we take the average of previous 3 
years' operating income. If the 3-year average is also negative, this variable is 
missing. 
Operating income = OIADP 
FVPA is from 10-k 
 
 
Analyst estimate available for 
operating profit 
This indicator variable is set to one if there is at least one analyst estimate of 
operating profit, and set to zero otherwise 
IBES 
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This indicator variable is set to one when the ratio of R-square of operating 
income regression to net income regression is greater than the median, and set 
equal to zero otherwise. We define the median values of this ratio separately 
for Canadian and US firms. 
 
Both the operating income and net income regressions are run using 16 
quarters of data just prior to the beginning of the post-period.  
 
Operating Income regression: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+3 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖1 
Net Income regression: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+3 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖2 
 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+3 is the market value per share defined as the closing share price three 
months after the fiscal quarter end; Operating income and net income are per 
share values. 
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Appendix C 
Entropy balancing procedure 
 
 We use entropy balancing method to achieve a balance of covariates between our 
treated sample (i.e., US firms) and control sample (i.e., Canadian firms). Entropy balancing 
creates a set of weights for the control sample such that the first, second, and higher moments 
of the covariate distributions in the treatment and the reweighted control sample are equalized 
(Hainmueller 2012). To achieve this, entropy balancing places higher weights on Canadian 
firms that are similar to the US firms along the chosen balancing dimensions (Ferri et al. 2018; 
McMullin & Schonberger 2020; Shroff et al. 2017).  Entropy balancing is particularly helpful 
in preserving the size of the control sample, which is pertinent when the size of the treated and 
control samples are vastly different (Laurion 2020).  
 We choose to balance on the mean of the following variables: size, leverage, SDCF, 
NOL, Dividend, PBO_handcollect, FVPA_handcollect, fundratio_compustat, 
fundratio_square_compustat, horizon. After entropy balancing, all the control variables above 
have equivalent means between the treatment and reweighted control sample.  
 One drawback of entropy balancing is that it could assign large weights to a handful of 
control observations, especially when there is less overlap between the treated and control 
sample (McMullin & Schonberger 2020). This becomes a problem particularly in sub-sample 
analysis, where the number of control firms is low. As a result, entropy balancing in sub-
samples does not give us as close a distribution of balancing variables as in the main analyses.  
A similar issue of not having close distribution in sub-groups has been noted in Shroff et al. 
(2017). 
 Below, we tabulate the distribution properties of the US (treatment) firms and the 
Canadian (control) firms before and after applying our entropy balancing procedure. 
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Table C1 
Pre- and post-weighting distributional properties of treatment and control firms 
 
          Before Entropy Balancing   After Entropy Balancing 
VARIABLES US Pre-Period   Canada Pre-Period   Canada Pre-Period 
  N Mean SD   N Mean SD   N Mean SD 
Size 746 8.128 1.917  139 7.413 2.090  139 8.127 1.681 
Leverage 746 0.252 0.189  139 0.253 0.186  139 0.252 0.160 
SDCF ($'m) 746 0.338 1.201  139 0.537 1.835  139 0.340 1.264 
NOL 746 0.575 0.495  139 0.590 0.494  139 0.575 0.495 
Dividend 746 0.0166 0.0233  139 0.0153 0.0173  139 0.0166 0.0187 
PBO (S'm) 746 1980 4674  139 1617 3243  139 1982 3233 
FVPA ($'m) 746 1745 4187  139 1538 3196  139 1748 2874 
Fund Ratio 746 0.836 0.194  139 0.875 0.189  139 0.837 0.194 
Fund Ratio 
Square 746 0.737 0.328  139 0.800 0.295  139 0.737 0.278 
Horizon 746 7.495 5.770  139 6.043 5.102  139 7.496 6.382 
                        
This table presents the distributional properties (mean and standard deviation) for US (treatment) and Canadian 
(control) firms in the original sample and after the reweighting of the control sample using entropy balancing 
technique. We use entropy balancing method to achieve a balance of covariates between our treated sample and 
control sample. We choose to balance on the mean of the variables listed in this table, using its values in the pre-



















 US Canada Total 
 # Observations # Observations # Observations 
No of firms that sponsor a defined benefit pension plan with data for 
the last fiscal year before ASU2017-07  1,328 198 1,526 
Less: Observations with missing values for dependent variables and 
controls (498) (49) (547) 
Less: Observations dropped due to not having both pre- and post  (80) (10) (90) 
Less: Voluntary early adopters (4)   (4) 
Number of firms in the sample 746 139 885 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics – USA Sample 
PANEL A: USA Sample: Pre-Period     
  P25 P50 P75 Mean SD 
%Equities 25.33 43.22 57.61 40.41 21.68 
%Fixed Income 27.73 38.63 51.65 40.45 20.47 
ERR (%) 5.580 6.500 7.070 6.198 1.352 
SDCF (S'm) 0.0341 0.0648 0.133 0.338 1.201 
Market Cap (S'm) 1,165 3,494 13,547 14,920 32,090 
Leverage 0.0911 0.253 0.355 0.252 0.189 
Horizon 3.918 4.652 7.082 7.495 5.770 
Dividends 0.00110 0.00960 0.0227 0.0166 0.0233 
Fund Ratio 0.747 0.842 0.937 0.836 0.194 
Fund Ratio Square 0.559 0.709 0.879 0.737 0.328 
NOL 0 1 1 0.575 0.495 
Market Return 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.189 0.0619 
FVPA (S'm) 58.78 297.8 1200 1745 4187 
PBO (S'm) 80.1 350.4 1351 1980 4674 
Size  7.061 8.159 9.514 8.128 1.917 
 
PANEL B: USA Sample: Post-Period 
 P25 P50 P75 Mean SD 
%Equities 16.84 36 52 34.82 21.56 
%Fixed Income 31.36 42.87 58.28 45.26 22.23 
ERR (%) 5.202 6.250 7 5.968 1.399 
SDCF (S'm) 0.0322 0.0625 0.128 0.343 1.211 
Market Cap (S'm) 876.6 2,935 11,525 13,753 31,026 
Leverage 0.0813 0.251 0.365 0.254 0.189 
Horizon 3.878 4.683 7.610 7.605 5.872 
Dividends 0.00140 0.00981 0.0230 0.0173 0.0241 
Fund Ratio 0.731 0.835 0.936 0.832 0.196 
Fund Ratio Square 0.534 0.698 0.877 0.731 0.332 
NOL 0 1 1 0.579 0.494 
Market Return -0.118 -0.118 -0.118 -0.0908 0.0558 
FVPA (S'm) 60.4 272.6 1132 1648 4028 
PBO (S'm) 74.19 325.5 1289 1882 4511 
Size  6.776 7.985 9.352 7.951 1.971 
Notes: All variables are defined in Appendix B. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for US firms in the 
pre-ASU 2017-07 period, while panel B provides the descriptive stats for the post period 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics – Canada Sample 
PANEL A: Canada Sample: Pre-Period 
  P25 P50 P75 Mean SD 
%Equities 31 46 59.00 42.97 20.95 
%Fixed Income 29 39 50 40.73 19.55 
ERR (%) 3.900 5.800 6.500 5.496 1.314 
SDCF (S’m) 0.0453 0.0930 0.161 0.537 1.835 
Market Cap (S’m) 550.2 2,035 8,512 7,301 12,683 
Leverage 0.120 0.241 0.370 0.253 0.186 
Horizon 3.550 4.003 5.078 6.043 5.102 
Dividends 0.00147 0.0117 0.0236 0.0153 0.0173 
Fund Ratio 0.785 0.904 0.981 0.875 0.189 
Fund Ratio Square 0.616 0.816 0.963 0.800 0.295 
NOL 0 1 1 0.590 0.494 
Market Return 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.193 0.0657 
FVPA (S’m) 39.07 172.2 1275 1538 3196 
PBO (S’m) 43.75 206.7 1455 1617 3243 
Size  6.310 7.618 9.049 7.413 2.090 
 
PANEL B: Canada Sample: Post-Period 
  P25 P50 P75 Mean SD 
%Equities 25.82 41 56 39.14 20.83 
%Fixed Income 31 42 55.10 43.24 20.02 
ERR (%) 4 5.600 6.500 5.305 1.398 
SDCF (S’m) 0.0486 0.0919 0.167 0.575 1.947 
Market Cap (S’m) 389.6 1,233 6,337 6,217 11,859 
Leverage 0.120 0.250 0.379 0.262 0.191 
Horizon 3.476 4.034 5.147 6.240 5.302 
Dividends 0.00195 0.0118 0.0238 0.0180 0.0272 
Fund Ratio 0.814 0.898 0.976 0.864 0.188 
Fund Ratio Square 0.662 0.807 0.952 0.781 0.290 
NOL 0 1 1 0.604 0.491 
Market Return -0.118 -0.118 -0.118 -0.0930 0.0595 
FVPA (S’m) 33.69 150.4 1119 1395 2891 
PBO (S’m) 39.78 183.1 1224 1486 2963 
Size  5.965 7.117 8.754 7.128 2.166 
Notes: All variables are defined in Appendix B. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for Canadian firms in 
the pre-ASU 2017-07 period, while panel B provides the descriptive stats for the post period 
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Table 4 
Difference-In-Difference Regressions of %EQUITIES or % Fixed Income Using US Firms 
(Treatment) and Canadian Firms (Control) 
 
%EQUITIES (%Fixed Income) = β0 + β1 POST + β2  US + β3 US * POST + Σ CONTROLS 
 
 Panel A: No Entropy Balancing  Panel B: Entropy Balancing 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE %Equities %Fixed Income  %Equities %Fixed Income 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
           
Post -3.066*** 3.359***  -3.187*** 3.227** 
 (0.998) (1.157)  (1.162) (1.305) 
US X Post -1.583** 2.163***  -2.197** 2.595*** 
 (0.764) (0.817)  (0.867) (0.867) 
Size 0.840 -1.016  2.163** -1.893* 
 (1.075) (1.044)  (1.044) (1.064) 
Leverage 5.599 -4.216  0.586 -3.172 
 (4.177) (5.858)  (6.056) (7.584) 
SDCF 0.100 0.213  -0.115 0.226 
 (0.418) (0.595)  (0.419) (0.598) 
NOL 2.610*** -2.284*  1.292 -1.341 
 (0.873) (1.174)  (1.024) (1.004) 
Fund Ratio -34.50 47.25  -75.64 27.40 
 (43.12) (56.69)  (53.66) (60.97) 
Fund Ratio Square 1.091 -2.765  19.79 11.50 
 (25.52) (32.59)  (29.23) (35.12) 
Horizon -0.0598 0.395  -0.0268 0.316 
 (0.214) (0.383)  (0.151) (0.231) 
Dividends 4.110 21.16  -12.26 37.01 
 (20.59) (28.66)  (23.36) (26.19) 
Market Return 3.405 2.651  0.0639 4.280 
 (2.617) (3.209)  (3.033) (3.412) 
Constant 59.09*** 9.470  72.10*** 22.13 
 (19.46) (25.51)  (24.68) (27.94) 
      
Observations 1,770 1,770  1,770 1,770 
R-squared 0.243 0.171  0.241 0.168 
Number of firms 885 885  885 885 
Cluster SE by firm YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES  YES YES 
      
Notes: All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
*, **, *** Denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).  
Panel A presents the results of the difference-in-difference specification without entropy balancing, while panel B presents the 
results with entropy balancing. The details of entropy balancing are presented in Appendix C. Post is an indicator variable that 
is set to 1 for fiscal years ending on or after Dec 15th, 2018, and set to 0 for fiscal years ending Dec 15th, 2017 to Dec 14th 
2018. The variable of interest US X Post is an interactive term. Due to firm fixed-effects, the coefficient of US is suppressed.  
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Table 5 
Difference-In-Difference Regressions of %EQUITIES Using US Firms (Treatment) and Canadian 
Firms  (Control) 
%EQUITIES = β0 + β1 POST + β2  US + β3 US * POST + Σ CONTROLS 
 PANEL A:  PANEL B: 
 
High values of expected 
return/other pension costs  
Low values of expected 
return/other pension costs 
      
        
Post -3.352**  -1.678 
 -1.629  (1.569) 
US X Post -3.515***  -0.236 
 (1.345)  (1.171) 
Size 1.741  -0.633 
 (1.699)  (1.215) 
Leverage 5.755  3.927 
 (6.644)  (5.685) 
SDCF -0.158  2.664* 
 (0.494)  (1.436) 
NOL 3.122*  2.230** 
 (1.659)  (1.066) 
FundRatio -64.79  -33.50 
 (118.5)  (49.92) 
FundRatio Square 12.70  4.641 
 (61.51)  (31.26) 
Horizon 0.0301  -0.236 
 (0.163)  (0.488) 
Dividends -18.07  2.153 
 (59.64)  (17.77) 
Market Return 0.332  9.302** 
 (3.912)  (3.660) 
Constant 71.30  65.61*** 
 (58.92)  (20.54) 
Difference in coefficients 
of US X Post across the 
two sub-samples 
  chi2(  1) =    6.86 
  Prob > chi2 =    0.0088*** 
    
Observations 840  842 
R-squared 0.272  0.243 
Number of firms 420  421 
Cluster SE by firm YES  YES 
Firm FE YES  YES 
Notes: All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
*, **, *** Denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).  
Panel A contains firms with high values (i.e. above median) of the ratio of expected return to all other components of pension 
costs in the year immediately before ASU 2017-07, and panel B contains firms with low values (i.e. below median) of the same 
ratio in the year immediately before ASU 2017-07.  If expected returns or any of the other costs are missing, this ratio is left 
undefined. We define the median values of this ratio separately for Canadian and US firms in the year immediately before ASU 
2017-07. Post is an indicator variable that is set to 1 for fiscal years ending on or after Dec 15th, 2018 and set to 0 for fiscal 
years ending Dec 15th, 2017 to Dec 14th 2018. The variable of interest US X Post is an interactive term. Due to firm fixed-
effects, the coefficient of US is suppressed.  
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Table 6 
Difference-In-Difference Regressions of %EQUITIES Using US Firms (Treatment) and Canadian 
Firms  (Control) 
%EQUITIES = β0 + β1 POST + β2  US + β3 US * POST + Σ CONTROLS 
 PANEL A:  PANEL B: 
 
High values of fvpa/operating 
income  
Low values of fvpa/operating 
income 
      
        
Post -1.484  -4.243** 
 (1.194)  (1.662) 
US X Post -2.370***  -0.729 
 (0.780)  (1.382) 
Size 0.359  -0.123 
 (1.552)  (2.003) 
Leverage 2.340  7.196 
 (3.414)  (10.28) 
SDCF -0.448  1.769* 
 (0.457)  (0.907) 
NOL 1.942**  2.518* 
 (0.946)  (1.421) 
FundRatio -81.49  -26.49 
 (70.88)  (53.76) 
FundRatio Square 37.62  -7.722 
 (42.38)  (31.90) 
Horizon 0.100  -0.281 
 (0.0829)  (0.369) 
Dividends -3.516  10.65 
 (18.84)  (36.99) 
Market Return 3.947  5.191 
 (3.180)  (4.802) 
Constant 75.70***  67.15** 
 (28.41)  (29.05) 
Difference in coefficients 
of US X Post  
chi2(  1) =    2.17  
Prob > chi2 =    0.1407 
    
Observations 850  852 
R-squared 0.303  0.238 
Number of firms 425  426 
Cluster SE by firm YES  YES 
Firm FE YES  YES 
Notes: All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
*, **, *** Denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).  
Panel A contains firms with high values (i.e. above median) of the ratio of fair value of plan assets to operating income in the 
year immediately before ASU 2017-07, and panel B contains firms with low values (i.e. below median) of this ratio in the year 
immediately before ASU 2017-07.  If operating income is negative, we use the average operating income in the past three years 
ending in the current year. If the three-year average operating income is negative, this variable is undefined and the observation 
is removed from this analysis. We define the median values of this ratio separately for Canadian and US firms in the year 
immediately before ASU 2017-07. Post is an indicator variable that is set to 1 for fiscal years ending on or after Dec 15th, 2018 
and set to 0 for fiscal years ending Dec 15th, 2017 to Dec 14th 2018. The variable of interest US X Post is an interactive term. 
Due to firm fixed-effects, the coefficient of US is suppressed.  
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Table 7 
Difference-In-Difference Regressions of %EQUITIES Using US Firms (Treatment) and Canadian 
Firms  (Control) 
%EQUITIES = β0 + β1 POST + β2  US + β3 US * POST + Σ CONTROLS 
 PANEL A:  PANEL B: 
 
Analyst estimate available for 
operating profit  
Analyst estimate not available for 
operating profit 
      
        
Post -2.255*  -3.411** 
 (1.236)  (1.563) 
US X Post -2.509**  -1.464 
 (1.009)  (1.094) 
Size 2.258*  0.355 
 (1.343)  (1.454) 
Leverage -0.648  11.43* 
 (4.587)  (6.700) 
SDCF -0.0291  0.143 
 (1.146)  (0.218) 
NOL 0.245  3.976*** 
 (1.007)  (1.358) 
FundRatio 84.98  -70.38 
 (131.7)  (57.58) 
FundRatio Square -66.70  19.02 
 (77.94)  (32.20) 
Horizon -0.450  0.296* 
 (0.339)  (0.163) 
Dividends 14.51  -7.193 
 (40.89)  (22.54) 
Market Return 1.560  3.809 
 (3.530)  (4.164) 
Constant -3.192  78.20*** 
 (54.46)  (26.87) 
Difference in coefficients 
of US X Post  
chi2(  1) =    1.02 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3123 
    
Observations 804  966 
R-squared 0.280  0.240 
Number of firms 402  483 
Cluster SE by firm YES  YES 
Firm FE YES  YES 
Notes: All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
*, **, *** Denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).  
Panel A contains firms that have at least one analyst estimate of operating profit in the year immediately before ASU 2017-07, 
and panel B contains firms with no analyst estimate of operating profit in the year immediately before ASU 2017-07. Firms that 
are not present in the IBES database are treated as not having any analyst estimate of operating profit, i.e. they are included in 
the Panel B sub-sample. Post is an indicator variable that is set to 1 for fiscal years ending on or after Dec 15th, 2018 and set to 
0 for fiscal years ending Dec 15th, 2017 to Dec 14th 2018. The variable of interest US X Post is an interactive term. Due to firm 
fixed-effects, the coefficient of US is suppressed.  
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Table 8 
Difference-In-Difference Regressions of %EQUITIES Using US Firms (Treatment) and Canadian 
Firms  (Control) 
%EQUITIES = β0 + β1 POST + β2  US + β3 US * POST + Σ CONTROLS 
 PANEL A:  PANEL B: 
 
High value relevance of operating 
income  
Low value relevance of operating 
income 
      
        
Post -2.154  -4.148*** 
 (1.422)  (1.515) 
US X Post -2.610**  -0.694 
 (1.081)  (1.127) 
Size 2.136  -0.474 
 (1.823)  (1.158) 
Leverage 15.46*  1.937 
 (8.186)  (4.160) 
SDCF 0.880  -0.295 
 (0.861)  (0.422) 
NOL 3.115***  2.023 
 (1.053)  (1.447) 
FundRatio -9.476  -91.27** 
 (55.09)  (45.29) 
FundRatio Square -7.387  27.11 
 (33.94)  (25.39) 
Horizon 0.235  -0.324 
 (0.181)  (0.385) 
Dividends 1.904  3.684 
 (31.74)  (25.27) 
Market Return 3.540  2.864 
 (3.926)  (3.537) 
Constant 27.53  102.9*** 
 (25.57)  (22.23) 
Difference in coefficients 
of US X Post  
chi2(  1) =    3.05* 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0806 
    
Observations 884  886 
R-squared 0.214  0.313 
Number of firms 442  443 
Cluster SE by firm YES  YES 
Firm FE YES  YES 
Notes: All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
*, **, *** Denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).  
Panel A contains firms with high (i.e. above median) value relevance of operating income as compared to net income, and panel 
B contains firms with low (i.e. below median) value relevance of operating income as compared to net income. Value relevance 
of operating income is calculated as the ratio of R-square of operating income regression to the R-square of net income 
regression using 16 quarters of data just prior to the beginning of the post-period.  
We define the median values of this ratio separately for Canadian and US firms in the period immediately before ASU 2017-
07. Post is an indicator variable that is set to 1 for fiscal years ending on or after Dec 15th, 2018 and set to 0 for fiscal years 
ending Dec 15th, 2017 to Dec 14th 2018. The variable of interest US X Post is an interactive term. Due to firm fixed-effects, 
the coefficient of US is suppressed.  
  













The figure at the top depicts a graphical representation of the change in mean values of %Equities between the pre- 
and post-ASU 2017-07 period for US (treatment) and Canadian (control) firms. The figure at the bottom depicts a 
graphical representation of the change in median values of %Equities between the pre- and post-ASU 2017-07 period 
for US (treatment) and Canadian (control) firms.  
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